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This paper develops a macroeconomic model for a small, open,
developing economy that borrows abroad - to study the dy-
namic interaction between debt and growth and the impacts of
various policies and exogenous shocks on the rate of capital
accumulation, the current account, and debt.  Adjustment poli-
cies that increase productivity and efficient use of capital in-
crease both growth and the stock of external debt  - but the new
level of debt may be sustainable in the long run.
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Most macrodynamic models of economics treat  *  An increase in productivity raises the long-
the supply of debt as infinitely elastic.  Using a  run stock of capital but leaves the level of
more realistic model, Bhandari, Haque, and  external debt and the interest rate unchanged in
Tumovsky have analyzed the dynamic conse-  the long run.
quences of various kinds of disturbances in a
representative small developing economy that  *  Fiscal expansion (an increase in govem-
can borrow only at a premium and therefore  ment spending) has almost no effect in either the
faces an upward-sloping supply of debt.  They  short run or the long run.  Consumers offset gov-
conclude that:  emient  spending by reducing private cr isump-
tion.  (This conclusion is based on the assump-
An upward shift in the supply of debt-  tion that employment is fixed.)
which may be taken to represent an increase in
the world interest rate - leads to a long-run  Bhandari, Haque, and Tumovsky developed
decline in external debt, a higher domestic  their macroeconomic model for a small, open,
interest rate, less capital stock, and a reduced  developing economy that borrows abroad - to
trade surplus.  At some stage, the trade surplus  study the dynamic interaction between debt and
becomes a deficit and more debt is accumulated.  growth and the impacts of various policies and
exogenous shocks on the rate of capital accumu-
An increase in the marginal cost of debt  lation, the current account, and debt.  They used
(risk premium) - which almost certainly raises  the intertemporal optimizing representative
the long-run domestic interest rate and lowers  agent model, which incorporates a realistic debt
the capital stock - may or may not lower long-  supply schedule and the risk premiums associ-
run external debt as well.  It depends on the ratio  ated with lending to sovereign borrowers, which
of the country's extemal debt to the net credit of  most models lack.
its private sector.
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draft.I.  Introduction
The contimAing  debt  crisis  that  many  developing  countries  have faced
in the  current  decade  has  underscored  the  need to  understand  the
relationships  between  debt  accumulation  and  growth,  as  well as the  need to
develop  policy  approaches  that  foster  adjustment  in  the  external  account
while  maintaining.  or  preferably  increasing,  the  growth  of output. There
is little  doubt  that  developing  economies  require  external  capital  since
typically  they  cannot  generate  adequate  resources  domestically  to  achieve
the  growth  rates  thaL  may  lead  to  an improvement  in living  standards.
Experience  with  external  borrowing,  however,  has shown  that  repayments  are
not always  easily  made  on time. This  has led  in some  cases,  to
substantial  adjustment  efforts  causing  a significant  cutback  in  domestic
development  efforts  and  hence  a  reduction  in the  rate  of growth. 'ver-
borrowing,  resulting  from  inadequate  perceptions  of  domestic  growth
potential,  has  occurred  on occasion. Long  gestation  lags  in investment
projects,  or the  inability  to  adequately  price  domestic  infrastructured
projects  that  have  been financed  by external  debt,  or a combination  of
both,  has led  to difficulties  in  meeting  repayment  commitments  in  some
cases  (Kharas  (1983),  Kharas  and  Shishido  (1986)). International  capital
markets  are  likely  to react  to their  perception  of a country's  ability  to
repay  and  hence  seek  to reduce  their  exposure  at  a time  when  a country
requires  more capital  (Sachs  (1984)). The question  of an appropriate  debt
strategy  for  sustained  growth  has therefore  been  an important  one in
recent  years.A related  issue,  that  has also  received  considerable  attention  during
this  period  of the  debt  crisis,  is that  of achieving  a needed  adjustment
in the  external  accounts  while  sustaining,  or even increasing,  the  growth
momentum  in the  economy. When  external  resources  are  not  available  to the
extent  necessary,  adjustment  is clearly  required  in  domestic  spending  and
resource  mobilization.  Concessional  external  financing  from  multilateral
agencies  such  as t'Be  Fund  and  the  Bank  is available  to allow  policy
packages  to  be implemented  to facilitate  such  adjustments  (Khan  et al).
The  desired  policy  mix for  making  such  adjustments  should  be growth
enhancing,  or at least  growth  preserving.
The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to develop  a  macroeconomic  model  for  a
small  open  developing  economy  that  borrows  abroad,  in  order  to  study  the
dynamic  interaction  between  debt  and  growth,  as well  as the  impacts  of
various  policies  and  exogenous  shocks  on the  rate  of capital
accumulation,  the  current  account,  and  debt. The  framework  we employ  is
that  of the  intertemporal  optimizing  representative  agent  model,  which  has
increasingly  been  used to  advantage  to analyze  a variety  of issues  in
international  macroeconomics.  j/
Despite  the  current  preoccupation  with the  debt  crisis,  there  are few
existing  macroeconomic  models  which  allow  issues  pertaining  to it to  be
.1/  For  recent  examples  of this  approach  applied  to  various  types  of
exogenous  and  policy  shocks  see  Brock  (1987),  Buiter  (1984),  Obstfeld
(1982,  1988),  Sen  and  Turnovsky  (1989a,  1989b).- 3 -
addressed  adequately.  1/  This  is  because  mo3t  of the  existing  literature
is  based  on uncovered  interest  parity  with the  supply  of debt  to the
economy  being  perfectly  elastic. On the  other  hand,  research  has shown
that  the  risks  associated  with sovereign  borrowing  does  result  in lenders
charging  a risk  premium  as  well  as,  on occasion,  cutting  off  credit  to
borrowers.  Z/  Thus  for  a substantive  analysis  of  debt related  issues  the
model  should  include  an appropriate  debt  supply  schedule  that  incorporates
the  risk  premia  associated  with lending  to sovereign  borrowers. The  model
presented  below  incorporates  such  a realistic  debt  supply  schedule.  1/
Since  fiscal  policy  is  an important  element  in growth,  debt  accumulation
and  adjustment  strategies,  the  model  analyzes  the  impact  of changes  in
government  expenditure  on the  key  macroeconomic  variables. Specifically
the  model  enables  us to analyze  the  impact  of  both  demand  management  and
structural  policies  on  variables  such  as the  household  consumption-saving
decisions,  the  investment  decisions  of the  firm,  and  the  current  account
and  hence  debt  accumulation.
J/  Reference  should  be made to  a recent  paper  by Otani  and  Villanueva
(1988)  which  analyzes  the  accumulation  of capital  and  external  debt in  a
neoclassical  growth  model. However,  that  paper  adopts  a  very different
approach  and  emphasizes  different  issues  from  those  addressed  in the
present  paper.
ZI  See  for  example  Eaton  and  Gersovitz  (1981),  Sachs  (1984),  Cooper  and
Sachs  (1985). See  Edwards  (1984)  for  an empirical  investigation  of the
risk  premium.
2/  There  are  existing  macroeconomic  models  which  utilize  a debt  supply
function  similar  to that  used in  this  paper.  Eaton  and  Turnovsky  (1983)
incorporate  such  a function  in  their  analysis  of exchange  rate  dynamics
under  covered  interest  parity. Obstfeld  (1982)  also  considers  an upward
sloping  debt  function  in  his intertemporal  optimizing  analysis  of terms  of
trade  shocks.- 4 -
The  rest  of the  paper  is  organized  as follows: Section  II  specifies
the  analytical  framework. Section  III  discusses  the  long-run  effects  and
dynamics  of a balanced  budget  policy,  whiile  the  debt-financed  deficit
policy  is  discussed  in  Section  IV.  Section  V briefly  discusses
alternative  specifications  of the  debt  function. The  concluding  section
summarizes  the  main  results  of  the  paper  and  discusses  some  policy
implications  of the  analysis. For  convenience,  all technical  matters
relating  to the  solutions  are  discussed  in the  Appendix.
II.  The  Analytical  Framework
1.  The structure  of the  economy
The economy  we shall  consider  comprises  three  sectors: (i)
consumers;  (ii)  firms;  and (iii)  the  government. For  analytical
tractability  all  consumers  and  firms  are identical,  enabling  us to focus
on the  representative  unit in each  group. The economy  produces  a single
traded  good.  The  model  is real,  with  the  only  financial  asset  held  by
domestic  residents  being  a traded  bond.  International  borrowing  by the
government  is  allowed,  while  consumers  may  borrow  or lend  to the
government,  which  is largely  consistent  with  practice  in  borrowing
countries.
Unlike  most  macrodynamic  models  of the  type  considered  here,  our
model  incorporates  issues  of sovereign  risk. Eaton  and  Gersovitz  (1981)
have  shown  that  because  of the  moral  hazard  associated  with sovereign
risk,  lenders  will  charge  a risk  premium  on lending  to  countries,  and  may,on occasion,  also  apply  lending  limits.  1/  This risk  premium  may  vary
directly  with the  stock  of debt  that  the  country  holds  since  the
probability  of default  is likely  to incyiase  with increased  costs  of
servicing  the  debt,  unless  the  costs  as30eiated  with default  also
increase  with debt  accumulation.  Sachs  (1984),  Sachs  and  Cohen  (1982),
and  Cooper  and Sachs  (1985)  have shown  that  a country,  by adopting
apparent  growth-oriented  policies,  as  well  as policies  that  enhance  its
foreign  exchange  earning  capacity,  can  shift  the  upward  sloping  debt
supply  curve  outward,  so that  at each  level  of  debt  a lower  risk  premium
is  being  charged.  Thus,  for  example,  larger  investment  efforts  or the
adoption  of efficiency-enhancing  structural  adjustment  packages  will
result  in  a lower  evaluation  of country  risk  by lenders. The  main
conclusion  of this  literature  is that  the  level  of indebtedness  of the
country  is  likely  to determine  both the  extent  of additional  credit  that
is  likely  to  be made available,  as well  as the  terms  on which  it  will  be
made  available. This  proposition  is  best formalized  by an  upward  sloping
supply  curve.
To incorporate  this  feature  of international  borrowing,  we assume
that  the  interest  rate,  i(z),  charged  on foreign  debt,  z, is:
i(z)  - io  +  ijw(z)  &l(z)  >  0, W"(z) >  0  (1)
/  Stiglitz  and  Weiss (1981)  have  shown  that  even  in  cases  of
individual  borrowing  because  of informational  asymmetries  or problems
associated  with  moral  hazard,  risk  premia  or credit  constraints,  or  both,
are  known  to exist.-6-
where io is the  interest  rate  prevailing  internationally  and  i1w(z) is the
country  specific  risk  premium  which  varies  directly  with the  scock  of debt
held  by the  country.  .1/ The  possibility  of a cutoff  in debt,  is captured
by the  assumption  that  the  function  w(z) is  convex  (w"(z)  >  0).  In this
case,  the  fact  that  the  interest  rate  rises  at an increasing  rate  with the
level  of indebtedness  means  that  at some  point  it  becomes  prohibitive,  so
that  an effective  lending  limit  is  reached.  2/  With this  specification,
an exogenous  increase  in foreign  interest  rates  is  captured  by an increase
in io,  while  an exogenous  shift  in  country-specific  risk  can  be
represented  by a shift  in the  parameter  il.  i/
a.  Consumers
Interest  parity  requires  that  the  domestic  interest  rate  be
equalized  with that  facing  the  economy. Hence  expression  (1)  abovr.  will
also  represent  the  interest  rate  prevai'ing  at  home,  at  which  domestic
consumers  can  borrow  or lend  to  the  government.  With  this  background  the
representative  consumer  chooses  his consumption  and  bond  holdings  to
maximize  the intertemporal  utility  function:
J/  Since  the  framework  is  designed  to  deal  with  debtor  countries  we
shall  assume  throughout  that  z  >  0.
_/  This  enables  us to  depict  the  Eaton  and  Gersovitz  (1981a,b)
argument.
i/  This formulation  which  postulates  the  cost  of debt  to depend  upon
the  absolute  level  of national  debt  is  similar  to that  adopted  by Eaton
and  Turnovsky  (1983)  and  Obstfeld  (1982). Alternative  specifications
which  incorporate  the  endogeneity  of country-creditworthiness  as  argued  by
Sachs  (1984)  and  others  will  be considered  later.-7-
U(x,7)  e  -ft  dt  ux > ° ,  Ux  <  °  (2)
subject  to the  budget  constraint:
x+b  - wi +  I  +  i(z)b  - T  (3)
and  the  initial  condition:
b(O)  - bo
where  x is  consumption,  X  is  labor  supply  assumed  to  be fixed,  P  is the
consumer  rate  of time  discount,  w is the  wage rate, r  is  profi
distributed  by firms  to  households,  b is  the  stock  of debt (or  bonds)  held
by domestic  residents,  and  T denotes  lump  sum  taxes.  1/ The  utility
function  is  assumed  to  be concave.  2/  The  present  value  Hamiltonian  for
the  consumer  problem  may  be written  as:
H  - e  Pt(U(x,)  +  X  [wl  +  r  +  i(a-b)b  - T - x - b3)  (4)
where  a denotes  the  total  stock  of government  debt (a  - z +  b),  and  A  is
the  Lagrange  multiplier  associated  with the  budget  constraint. The
1/ For  simplicity,  labor  is  assumed  to  be fixed. Since  in  a
developing  country  context  the  endogeneity  of labor  is  not  likely  to  be a
critical  issue,  this  assumption  is  not  viewed  as being  particularly
restrictive.
2/ If  b >  0 the  consumprs  are  creditors  while  if  b < 0 then  they  are
debtors. An examination  of the  budget  constraint  shows  that  if  consumers
are  creditors,  then  acquisition  of increasingly  costly  debt  by the
government  adds  to disposable  income  and  conversely.required  optimality  condition  for  the  individual's  consumption  decision
is:  I/
ux  (5)
The  optimal  dynamic  path is  determined  by the  budget  constraint,  along
with
- - i-i-b  (.
as well  as the  transversality  condition:
lim Abe f  0  (7)
Equation  (6)  determines  optimal  bond accumulation  by equating  the  marginal
rate  or return  to  consumers  on consumption  (the  left  hand  side)  to the
marginal  cost  of an additional  unit  of debt  facing  consumers.  2/
b.  Firms
Firms  produce  output  using  capital  and  the  fixed  supply  of labor  by
means  of the  production  function  y - f(k,) which  is  assumed  to  possess
standard  neo-classical  properties.  Net  profits  of the  firm  at each  point
in time  are, therefore,  given  by:
j/  Subscripts  and  primes  (')  denote  derivatives.
ZI Note that  the  cost  of  debt  depends  on  whether  the  consumer  is  a net
creditor  or a net  debtor. In the  former  case  the  marginal  cost  exceeds
the  interest  rate;  in the  latter  case,  the  opposite  is true.-9
t(t)  - f(k,1)  - vi  - C(I)  (8)
where  I is the  rate  of inveL-ment.
The function  C(I)  represents  the  installation  costs  associated  with
th;  purchase  of I units  of  new  capital. It is  assumed  to  be an increasing
convex  function  of I:C'>O,  C">O.  In addition,  we assume  C(O)  - 0,
C'(O)  - 1  so that  the  total  cost  of zero  investment  is  zero,  and  the
marginal  cost  of the  initial  installation  is  unity. This formulation  of
the  installation  function  follows  the  original  specification  of adjustment
costs  introduced  by Lucas  (1967)  and  Gould (1968).  1/  More  recent  work  by
Hayashi  (1982)  and  others  postulates  an installation  function  which
depends  upon  k as well  as I.  This  modification  makes  little  difference  to
our  analysis  and  for  simplicity  we retain  the  simpler  specification.
The firm's  optimization  problem  is to
Maximize  J  r(t)e fOi(s)dsdt - J  (f(k,1)-wX-C(I)]e  i  dt(9)
subject  to
i  - I  (10)
1/  Note  that  this  specification  implies  that  in the  case  where
disinvestment  may  occur  I  <  0, C(I)  <  0 for  low  rates  of disinvestment.
This  may  be interpreted  as reflecting  the  revenue  obtained  as capital  is
sold  off.  The  possibility  that  all  changes  in  capital  are  costly  can  be
incorporated  by introducing  sufficientiy  large  fixed  costs,  so that
C(0)  >  0.  This  doEs  not  alter  our  analyses  in  any  substantive  way.- 10
and the  initial  condition
k(O) - ko
Two further  points  about  this  specification  of the  firm's
optimization  problem  should  be noted. First,  (10)  abstracts  from  physical
depreciation.  Second,  the  firm  is assumed  to  finance  investment  purely
from  retained  earnings  and therefore  does  not  borrow.
Writing  the  Hamiltonian  function  for  firms  as
t  r
H-  eJ  i(s)ds[f(k,7)  - wA - C(I)J  + qe JO  i(s)ds( 1-)  (11)
where  q is the  Lagrange  multiplier  associated  with the  accumulation
equation  (10),  the  optimality  conditions  are:
C'-(I)  - q  (12)
fk  -4  +  i(z)q  (13)
w  - fl(k,7)  (14)
together  with the  transversality  condition
rt
lim  qke *J  i(s)ds  _ 0  (15)
Equation  (12)  determines  the  level  of investment  in each  period  by- 11  -
equating  the  marginal  cost  of investment  to the  shadow  price  capital.
Equation  (1.)  can  be rewritten  es:
fk(k,7)  q
fk(k)  +  - - i(z)  (16)
q  q
Here  the  left  hand side,  which  equals  the  sum  of the  marginal  physical
product  of capital  deflated  by q, and  the  percentage  rate  of change  in the
shadow  price  of capital,  i.e.,  q/q,  is the  rate  of return  on investing  in
a unit  of capital. Optimality  requires  that  this  retarn  should  be
equated,  at each  point  in time  to the  interest  rate.  In  view  of the
assumption  about  labor  supply,  equation  (14)  requires  that  the  wage rate
be set  equal  to the  marginal  physical  product  of the  fixed  supply  of
labor.
c.  Government
The  remaining  agent  in  the  domestic  economy  is the  government,  which
operates  in  accordance  with its  budget  constraint
a - g +  i(z)a  - T  (17)
Thus,  government  spending,  g,  plus  the  interest  obligations  on outstanding
government  debt  i(z)a,  must  be financed  either  by additional  taxes,  which
we take  to  be lump  sum,  or  by issuing  additional  debt.  Of course,  the
government  retains  the  choice  of  borrowing  at home  o,r  abroad.- 12 -
2.  Macroeconomic  equilibrium
Summing  the  consumers  budget  constraint  (3),  the  firm's  profit
relation  (8),  and  the  government  budget  constraint  (17),  and  noting  that
z  - a  - S, the  rate  of decumulation  of foreign  debt,  -4, is shown  to  equal
the  current  account  balance.  i/
-4 - f(k)  -x  -C(I)  -g -i(z)z  (18)
The current  account  balance  is simply  the  sum  of the  trade  balance,
f(k)-(x  +  C(I)  +  g),  plus the  service  account  which  in this  case  is only
the  debt  service,  -i(z)z.
By combining  the  optimality  conditions  derived  for  the  individual
sectors  abovA,  together  with  the  accumulation  equations,  the  macroeconomic
equilibrium  may  be summarized  as follows:
Ux(x)  - A  (19a)
C'(I)  - q  (19b)
- AX(-i(z)  +  i'(z)(a-z)]  (20a)
q - i(z)q - fk(k)  (20b)
- I(q)  (20c)
z - x +  C(I) +  g - f(k) +  i(z)z  (20d)
j/  From  here on for  convenience,  labor  will  be suppressed.- 13 -
a  - g +  i(z)a  - T  (20e)
The  pair  of static  equations  (19a),  (19b)  determine  consumption  as a
function  of the  marginal  utility  of consumption,  A,
x - x(A)  xI  < 0  (21a)
and investment  as a function  of its  shadow  price  q
I - I(q)  I' >  0  (21b)
The latter  equation  will  be recognizec.  as  being  a Tobin  q theory  of
investment.  Substituting  for  x and  I into  (20a)  - (20e)  describes  the
dynamics  of the  economy.
It is  well  known  that  when  capital  is  perfectly  mobile
internationally,  so that  the  interest  rate  facing  the  small  economy  is
fixed  at the  given  world  rate,  that  the  dynamic  structure  simplifies
drastically. In order  for  a steady-state  equilibrium  to exist  in  such  an
economy,  the  discount  rate,  0,  must  equal  the  world  interest  rate,  and
this  implies  that  the  marginal  utility  of consumption  must  remain
constant,  at A, say. The dynamics  of the  accumulation  of capital  k and
its  shadow  price  q,  whiich  constitute  the  core  dynamics  of the  economy,  are
jointly  determined  by (20c)  and (20b),  respectively.  The  long-run
equilibrium  in  such  an economy  has  the  property  that  it  depends  upon  the
initial  stocks  of real  and  financial  assets. This in turn  means  that
temporary  shocks  have  permanent  effects;  see,  e.g.,  Sen  and  Turnovsky
(1989a)  for  an example  of such  a  model.- 14 -
The fact  that  the  economy  faces  an upward  sloping  supply  function  for
debt changes  the  dynamics  in a fundamental  way.  With the  domestic
interest  rate  depending  upon  the  stock  of national  debt,  the  discount  rate
6  is  no longer  tied  to the  world  interest  rate,  and the  marginal  utility
of consumption,  A, is  not  constant. Instead,  it  depends  upon  the
accumulation  of both  foreign  debt  z and  government  debt  a, and thereby,
the  dynamics  of the  entire  economy  become  highly  interdependent.
In  order  to  complete  the  specification  of the  dynamics,  government
budgetary  policy  needs  to  be specified. As a  useful  benchmark,  which  is
analytically  tractable,  we shall  focus  first  on the  balanced-budget  policy
a  - 0,  T - g +  i(z)a
where  lump  sum taxes  T are  continually  adjusted  to finance  expenditures.
In  Section  IV  below,  we shall  also  discuss  a form  of debt  financing. In
order  to  be sustainable  in the  long  run,  this  needs  to  be accompanied  by a
once-and-for-all  change  in lump  sum  taxes.
Using  this  model  we shall  analyze  the  long-run  and  short-run  effects
of a number  of disturbances,  focusing  on the  tradeoffs  these  incur  on the
rate  of capital  accumulation,  on the  one  hand,  and the  accumulation  of
foreign  debt,  on the  other.
III.  Balanced  Budget  Policy
1.  The  long  run
As noted  in Section  III.2  and  shown  in the  Appendix,  the  dynamics  of
the  system  involves  forward  looking  behavior. The short-run  transition  is- 15  -
therefore  determined  in  part  by the  long-run  steady  state. It is
therefore  convenient  to  begin  with  a consideration  of the  latter. Since
the  government  is  assumed  to  maintain  a  balanced  budget,  its  stock  of debt
remains  fixed  at a say.
The  steady  state  of the  economy  is  reached  when all  the  variables
cease  to cnange,  i.e.,  A - 4 - - z - 0.  With  no depreciation  of
capital,  steady-state  investment  is  zero,  which  in turn  implies  that  the
shadow  price  of investment,  q  - 1.  Denoting  the  steady-state  values  by
tildes,  the  long  run  can  be described  by:
J'(x)  - A  (22a)
i(z)  - i'(z)(a-z)  - p  (22b)
fk(k) - i(z) - io +  ilw(z)  (22c)
f(k)  - x - g - i(z)z  (22d)
i - g  +  i(z)a  (22e)
These  equations  jointly  determine  the  steady-state  values  of the  marginal
utility  A, consumption  x, capital  stock  k, national  debt  z,  and lump  sum
taxes  T.
The  equilibrium  defined  by (22a)  - (22e)  has a  particularly  simple
recursive  structure. The  equilibrium  level  of the  foreign  debt  z is
determined  by (22b)  which  requires  that  consumers  equate  the  costs  or
returns  to them  of buying  or selling  the  marginal  bond to their  rate  of
time  preference. Since  the  debt schedule  facing  the  economy  and  hence  the
consumer,  is  upward  sloping,  the  cost (or  return)  to  holding  a  marginal- 16 -
bond equals  the  interest  rate  plus  the  impact  of the  additional  bond  on
the  interest  rate. Having  determined  z, the  domestic  rate  of interest  is
determined  by the  debt  supply  schedule. Equation  (2^c)  then  determines
the  long-run  capital  stock  by equating  the  marginal  physical  product  of
capital  to the  domestic  interest  rate. At the  same  time,  (22e)  determines
the  required  lump  sum  taxes  necessary  to  finance  government  expenditures
and  interest  on outstanding  government  debt.  Equation  (22d)  is the
steady-state  balance  of payments  equilibrium  condition. In the  long  run,
the  country  must  run  a balance  of trade  surplus  of sufficient  magnitude  to
finance  the  interest  on the  outstanding  foreign  debt. Given  the  capital
stock,  and  hence  output,  and  the  level  of interest  payments,  this
determines  the  level  of consumption  x.  Finally,  given  x, the  equilibrium
marginal  utility  of  consumption  X  is  determined  by (22a).
Table  1  summarizes  the  long-run  effects  of shifts  in the  exogenous
variables  namely:  the  foreign  interest  rate,  io;  the  risk  premium,  ij;  a
productivity  shock  O;  and  an increase  in  government  expenditure,  g; on the
macroeconomic  variables,  i.e.,  the  stock  of debt,  the  capital  stock,  the
domestic  interest  rate,  the  trade  balance,  consumption,  and  taxation.  LI
An increase  in the  level  of international  interest  rates,  represented
by an upward  shift  in io raises  the  marginal  return  or cost  to consumers
from  holding  an additional  bond.  Since  in the  long-run,  this  marginal
return  must  equal  the  fixed  rate  of time  discount  fi,  this  requires  a
1/  The  condition  2i'-i"b  >  0 given  in  Table  1 is  essentially  a
stability  condition;  see  Appendix.- 17 -
reduction  in the  former,  to offset  the  effect  of the  higher  io,  and
maintain  equality  with the  latter. This is  brought  about  by a reduction
in  the  level  of external  debt,  z.  What this  does  to the  domestic  interest
rate is  not entirely  clear. On the  one  hand,  the  upward  shift  in the  debt
supply  schedule  leads  to  a substitution  away  from  foreign  debt  to domestic
debt,  putting  upward  pressure  on the  domestic  interest  rate. On the  other
hand,  the  reduction  in the  long-run  stock  of external  debt  lowers  the  risk
premium. The  overall  effect  depends  upon  which  of these  factors  dominates
and  this in  turn  depends  critically  upon the  nature  of the  risk  premium
function  w(z).  Intuition  would  suggest  that  the  domestic  interest  rate
will,  on  balance,  rise,  and  this  in fact  is likely  to  be so  under
realistic  conditions.  For  example,  if the  debt  supply  schedule  is linear
(i"  - 0) or if domestic  private  residents  hold  no  bonds (b  - 0), then  a
rise in  the  more  costly  foreign  debt  does indeed  result  in  a rise in the
domestic  interest  rate,  though  not  by the  full  amount. In fact,  a 1
percentage  point  increase  in  the  foreign  interest  rate  leads  to  a .5
percentage  point  increase  in  the  domestic  interest  rate.  If il  > 0 and
domestic  private  residents  are  net  debtors  (b  < 0),  the  upward  pressure  on
the  domestic  interest  rate  is increased. On the  other  hand,  if i"  >  0 and
domestic  private  residents  are  larger  creditors  (b  >  0),  the  response  of
the  domestic  interest  rate  is reduced  and indeed  it  may  now fall.  1/ We
view this  however,  as a highly  unlikely  scenario.
I/  Assuming  a convex  debt  function  of the  form i  - io + ilzl,  a >  1,
this  will  be so if the  ratio  b/a  >  1/a.- 18 -
The  response  of the  domestic  capital  stock  depends  upon that  of the
domestic  interest  rate.  Taking  the  more  plausible  case  where  the  latter
rises,  the  equilibrium  capital  stock  falls,  while  the  financing
requirement  cf the  government  rises. As noted,  in the  long  run,  the trade
surp!u's  must finance  the  interest  costs  i(z)z  of the  foreign  debt. While
one  effect  of the  higher  foreign  interest  rate  is to  reduce  the  stock  of
foreign  debt,  this  is likely  to be offset  by a  higher  domestic  interest
rate.  The  net  effect  on total  interest  payments  is  unclear  and  depends
upon  the  function  w(z).  In the  case  where  this  is linear,  the  decline  in
foreign  debt  dominates  the  higher  domestic  interest  rate  and  overall
interest  payments  decline. Assuming  this  case  prevails,  the  long-run
trade  balance  which  was,  and  remains,  in surplus  to  meet the  economy's
interest  obligations,  is  reduced. What  happens  to  domestic  consumption  is
uncertain,  even  in the  simplest  case. For  example,  while  the  linear  debt
schedule  leads  to  a reduction  in capital  stock  and  hence  output,  less
output  is  now  devoted  to interest  payments  on international  debt. ./  The
net  effect  on consumption  depends  upon  which  of these  influences
dominates. Moreover,  since  utility  is  a function  of consumption,  an
]/  These  results  may  be usefully  compared  with the  long-run  effects  of
an increase  in the  foreign  interest  rate  under  the  limiting  assumption  of
uncovered  interest  parity. In  such  a  model,  the  domestic  interest  rate
rises  by the  same  amount  as  does the  foreign  interest  rate,  leading  to  a
larger  fall  in the  domestic  capital  stock  than  in the  present  case.  The
stock  of external  debt  can  be shown  to decline  by an amount  which is
proportional  to  the  reduction  in the  capital  stock,  with the  resulting
effect  on the  long-run  trade  balance  being  ambiguous,  depending  upon the
stock  of external  debt.- 19  -
upward  shift  in  the  cost  of debt  may,  or may  not,  lead  to a  corresponding
reduction  in steady-state  welfare.
Turning  to  the  impact  of an increase  in the  risk  premium  il,  we see
that  this  will  raise  or lower  the  marginal  return  or cost  to consumers
from  holding  additional  debt,  according  to  whether  w-w'b  Z  0.  In the  case
where  domestic  consumers  are  net  debtors  (b  <  0),  this  quantity  is
certainly  positive,  raising  the  marginal  cost  to them  of incurring
additional  debt.  As a result,  they  reduce  their  level  of debt (i.e.,
increase  b) so  as to  maintain  the  equality  between  the  marginal  cost  of
debt  and the  fixed  rate  of time  preference  f.  In this  case,  external  debt
will .all. However,  if consumers  are  net  creditors,  the  marginal  return
to  holding  more  debt  may  either  rise  or fall  with il,  even for  the
simplest  debt function,  depending  upon  the  level  of b.  In the  case  where
b is  sufficiently  small  so that  w-w'b  >  0, external  debt  will  still  fall.
However,  if  b is  sufficiently  large  to reverse  this  inequality,  a  higher
risk  premium  will lead  to  a higher  equilibrium  stock  of external  debt.  1/
The  response  of the  domestic  interest  rate  depends  upon  whether  the
upward  shift  in  the  marginal  cost  of debt  broughr  about  by il  more than
offsets  the  decline  resulting  from  the  likely  reduction  in  the  stock  of
external  debt. Again  this  depends  upon  the  form  of the  function  W(z).
For  plausible  debt  supply  functions,  such  as the  linear,  or constant
1/  For  example,  for  the  constant  elasticity  convex  debt  function
i  - io  +  ilza,  a  - 1, the  quantity  w-cwb  - za- [z-ab]. The  criterion
determining  whether  external  debt falls  or rises  with il  depends  upon
whether  the  ratio  of the  country's  external  debt  to the  net  credit  of its
private  sector  is  greater  or less  than  a, i.e.,  whether  z/b  $  a.- 20 -
elasticity  (i  - io  +  il za,  a  >  1) the  interest  rate  will  certainly  rise.
However,  a decline  cannot  be ruled  out,  although  it  is even  less  likely  to
occur  than  in response  to an  upward  shift  in io.  The  stock  of capital
moves  counter  to the  interest  rate  and  therefore,  almost  certainly  will
fall. The  equilibrium  trade  balance  will rise  or fall  to cover  external
payments  commitments. Focusing  on the  linear  debt  supply  function,  if
domestic  residents  are  net  debtors,  external  debt  as  well as interest
payments  decrease  and therefore,  the  trade  surplus  declines;  otherwise  it
could  go in  either  direction. Finally,  the  effects  on long-run
consumption  and  utility  are  unclear,  although  both  will  decline  if net
interest  payments  increase.
Column  3  of Table  1 summarizes  the  effect  of a productivity  shock,  0,
which  is introduced  as a shift  operator  in the  production  function.  1/
Such  a disturbance  has  no effect  on the  steady  state  stock  of external
debt  and the  equilibrium  trade  balance  too,  remains  unaffected.  The
effect  on capital  stock  depends  on the  sign  of fko,  the  impact  of the
productivity  shock,  0, on the  marginal  physical  product  of capital. If
the  shock  is  productivity-enhancing  i.e.,  fko  > 0, the  capital  stock  will
rise;  if not,  it  will fall. The  effect  on consumption  depends  on  whether
or not the  shock  increases  output  i.e.,  f8 Z  0, and  whether  or not  capital
stock  increases.
The  last  column  of  Table  1  summarizes  the  impact  of a change  in
government  expenditures.  Since,  in this  model  all  government
1/  For  this  case,  the  production  function  is  changed  to  f(k,6).- 21 -
expenditures  are  merely  for  consumption  purposes,  and  the  government
budget  is  balanced,  a  change  in government  expenditure  affects  only the
consumption  of the  private  sector. Any increase  (decrease)  in government
expenditures  has to  be matched  fully  by an increase  (decrease)  in taxation
and  hence  a commensurate  decrease  (increase)  in  private  consumption.
2.  Transitional  dynamics
The  transitional  dynamic  behavior  of the  economy  is determined  by the
system  of differential  equations,  (14a)  - (14g). The solution  of this
fourth  order  dynamic  system  is  described  in the  Appendix. In the  short
run the  stock  variables,  k and  z may  be regarded  as predetermined.  Any
response  to  shocks  will,  therefore,  impact  on the  two  shadow  prices,  q(O)
and  A(O). As shown  in the  Appendix,  these  prices  are  determined  by the
expected  long  run  responses  of  both the  capital  stock  and  the  foreign
debt.  In this  respect,  the  dynamics  of the  system  are  forward  looking.
In this  section  we will  examine  the  transitional  effects  of exogenous
shocks,  namely,  shifts  in  the  debt  schedule,  productivity  shocks,  and
changes  in the  government  expenditure  levels. The  .:hocks  that  we will
consider  are  all  unanticipated  permanent  shocks.
a.  Increase  in foreign  interest  rate
The  previous  section  showed  that  an increase  in io leads  to a long-
run  decline  in external  debt  and  almost  certainly  in  the  stock  of capital
as  well.  Assuming  this  to  be so,  both  of these  long  run  effects
contribute  to  an immediate  fall  in the  shadow  price  of investment  q(O),- 22 -
and  therefore  in  the  level  of investment.  1/  The  rate  of capital
accumulation,  therefore  slows  down  as  a result  of this  shock. With the
stock  of foreign  debt  fixed  instantaneously,  a 1  percentage  point  increase
in the  foreign  interest  rate  leads  to  a corresponding  immediate  1
percentage  point  increase  in the  domestic  interest  rate  although  over
time,  the  domestic  rate  will  decline  to the  smaller  steady-state  response.
The  higher  short  term  interest  with  the  fixed  stock  of debt,  means  that
the  cost  of servicing  the  debt  also  immediately  increases,  although  it too
declines  over  time,  as  both the  interest  rate  and  the  stock  of debt
decline  to their  steady-state  values.
The  effect  of an increase  in io,  on initial  consumption  is  unclear.
Equation  (5)  shows  that  the  consumption  varies  inversely  with the
marginal  utility  of consumption,  A.  However,  we are  unable  to establish
unambiguously  the  initial  response  of A(O),  and  hence  that  of consumption.
Various  factors  are  in  effect. First,  the  short-run  marginal  utility
depends  upon the  long-run  marginal  utility,  A,  which  may  either  increase
or decrease,  as  previously  discussed. Secondly,  since  we know that  the
long-run  capital  stock  declines,  capital  will  decumulate  over  the
transition  path.  This  would  tend  to increase  consumption  over  the
transitional  path.  An offsetting  impact  on consumption,  however,  obtains
from  the  fact  that  long-run  external  debt is  known  to decline,  and  hence
1/  For  obvious  reasons  we restrict  our  discussion  to the  plausible  case
where  the  increase  in the  foreign  interest  rate  leads  to an increase  in
the  long-run  domestic  interest  rate  and  a corresponding  decline  in the
long-run  capital  stock. The  perverse  case,  where  the  long-run  interest
rate  declines  can  be analyzed  similarly  but is  of little  interest- 23 -
the  debt  stock  must  also  be reduced  in the  transition.  Since  the  long-run
debt  of the  government  is  known  to  be fixed  at a, the  private  supply  of
debt  has to increase  and  this  may  occur  at the  expense  of consumption.
The impact  effect  of the  increase  in  external  interest  rates  on the
trade  balance  is in the  direction  of increasing  the  surplus. Although  the
debt servicing  cost  on impact  increases  and  the  effect  on consumption  is
uncertain,  it  appears  that  the  decline  in investment  alone  is  sufficient
to increase  (reduce)  the  surplus  (deficit). Since  output  is  fixed  in the
short  run  because  of the  cost  of adjusting  the  capital  stock,  investment
has to  be reduced  to a level  that  will allow  enough  of a change  in the
trade  balance,  in  the  direction  of a surplus,  to  allow  the immediate
increase  in the  debt  servicing  commitments  to  be met  as  well as the  debt
stock  to  be reduced  as required  by long-run  considerations.
The  contrast  between  the  short-run  and  long-run  effects  of an  upward
shift  in the  cost  of debt  can  be usefully  summarized  at this  point. An
increase  in io leads  to long-run  declines  in  both the  capital  stock  and
the  level  of external  debt. Despite  a somewhat  higher  interest  rate,  the
long-run  cost  of debt  servicing  declines  and  this  requires  a smaller  trade
surplus  to finance. In the  short-run,  prior  to  any  adjustment  in  the
stock  of debt,  the  domestic  interest  rate  responds  by the  full  amount  of
the increase  in  the  foreign  rate.  Consequently  the  debt  servicing
requirements  in  the  short-run  are  increased. At the  same time,  since
higher  interest  rates  in the  long  run  lead  to  a reduced  capital  stock  in
the  long  run, investment  declines. The cumulative  effect  of these  changes- 24
is that  in the  short  run  the  trade  balance  improves  to  meet the  increase'd
interest  payments,  as  well  as to  allow  the  stock  of foreign  debt  to
decline.
Further  characterization  of the  transitional  dynamic  path followed  by
k and  z  can  be obtained  by using  the  dominant  eigenvalue  method  due to
Calvo  (1987). Writing  the  solutions  (A5),  (A6)  in  the  Appendix, for  ke
and  z in the  form
_  Al~t  ju2t
k-  k +Ale  + A2e
1  1  8t2
z  z +  0(p,)A,e  +(p2)A2e
we have
(Pf-2 )t  z-z  O(A,)Ale  l2t+O(A2  )A2
k-k  A e  +l+(A2) 1  +  OA
where  0(Pl)  >  0, C(P) < 0 are  defined  in the  Appendix. Since  A2 is the
dominant  stable  root  (i.e.,  0  > P2 >  pl), it  follows  that  as t-+
(z  - z)/(k  - k)  - O(P2) <  0.  That is, z and k asymptotically approach
their  respective  steady-state  values  along  a ray  he-ring  a  negative
slope  - 0(P2). The initial  phase  of the  path  can  be determined  by
evaluating  dz/dk,.and  d2z/dk 2 at the  initial  instant  t  - 0.  In the
present  case  of the  upward  shift  in the  cost  of debt,  io,  we have already- 25 -
essentially  shown  that  dz(O)/dk(O)  >  0, and imposing  additional  weak
conditions  we can  establish  further  that  d2z(0)/Dk(0) 2 <  0.
The transitional  path  followed  by k and  z is  illustrated  in Figure  1.
The  starting  point  is at the  origin,  with the  new  steady-state  equilibrium
being  at A, having  lower  stocks  of both  physical  capital  and  foreign
debt.  In the  limit,  this  is approached  along  the  locus  XX having  the
negative  slope  O(A2)*  Initially  the  declining  capital  stock  and  external
debt  causes  the  system  to  move in a southwesterly  direction  from  0.  The
convexity  of this  locus,  and  the  subsequent  convergence  along  the  negative
ray  implies  that  the  stock  of foreign  debt  overadjusts  during  the
transition.  After  declining  to the  point  B, z then  begins  to increase  to
its  new  equilibrium  level. Intuitively,  the  convexity  of the  transitional
locus  OA implies  an increasing  decline  in  k relative  to  z over time. This
in turn  leads  to  an eventual  decline  in  output,  which  exceeds  the  decline
in  other  components  of the  current  account. The  initial  current  account
surplus  eventually  becomes  a deficit  and  at that  time  additional  external
debt  is incurred.  1/
b.  Increase  in risk  Rremium
The qualitative  short-run  responses  to an increase  in the  marginal
cost  of debt,  il,  are  given  in  Column  2 of  Table  2.  As before  these
responses  also  depend  on the  long-run  response  of the  level  of external
debt,  which  as shown  in the  last  section  depends  upon (w'b-w). If
.1/  This contrasts  with  the  dynamics  under  the  limiting  case  of
uncovered  interest  parity  when the  paths  followed  by z and  k can  both  be
shown  to  be monotonic.- 26  -
cb  < w,  so that  z falls,  the  results  are  qualitatively  the  same  as those
for  an increase  in io  and  for  essentially  the  same  reasons. Once again
the  short-run  interest  rate  exceeds  the  long-run. If,  on the  other  hand,
W'b  > w,  so that  the  long-run  debt  rises,  short-run  responses  are  less
clear. Even  though  one  can  establish  that  there  will  be an initial
decline  in  the  shadow  cost  of capital  q(O),  causing  an immediate
decumulation  of capital,  it is  now  possible  for  this  to  be accompanied  by
a current  account  deficit  leading  to an increase  in foreign  debt.  In any
event  even if the  external  debt  does  not  decline  on impact,  it  will  have
to  rise  at some  point  during  the  transitional  path.
C.  Productivity  shock
The  productivity  shock  is  simpler  to  analyze. The  reason  is  that
since  it  has no long  run  impact  on national  debt,  the  only  long  run
response  driving  short  run  behavior  is the  change  in  the  capital  shock.
In order  to  be concrete,  assume  fka  >  0, i.e.,  the  productivity  shock
impacts  positively  on the  marginal  physical  product  of capital. In this
case,  the increase  in the  long  run  level  of the  capital  shock  will lead to
an instantaneous  increase  in the  shadow  price  q(O)  causing  investment
demand  to increase  and  an increased  accumulation  of capital  to take  place.
Moreover,  since  consumption  increases  in the  long  run,  the  steady  state
value  of the  marginal  utility  of consumption,  A, is  now  lower.
Instantaneously  A(O)  may  rise,  or  more likely  fall,  though  if  so,  by a
smaller  amount  than  in the  long-run. Consequently,  though  consumption
increases  immediately  it  will  not  increase  by the  full  amount  of the- 27  -
increase  expected  in the  steady  state. This is  because  as  capital  is
accumulated  over  the  transition,  the  expansion  in the  economy  stimulates
consumption.
There  is  no immediate  effect  on the  interest  rate  or interest
payments. The  higher  level  of investment  and the  likely  increase  in
consumption,  leads  to  a deterioration  in the  trade  balance  and  therefore
in the  current  account. Foreign  debt  therefore  begins  to accumulate
resulting  in a rising  interest  rate. However,  this  is only  temporary.
Over  time,  as capital  is  accumulated,  output  increases. Eventually,
output  exceeds  the  levels  of domestic  demand  by an amount  in  excess  of
that  of additional  interest  payments  leading  to  a surplus  on the  current
account. At that  time  foreign  debt  is reduced  and  eventually  returns  to
its  original  level. The  adjustment  path  followed  by capital  and  external
debt  is illustrated  in Figure  2.  The  dynamics  of debt  are  mirrored  in  the
behavior  of interest  rates. Increasing  current  account  deficits  and
accumulating  debt  lead  to rising  domestic  interest  rates  on account  of the
increasing  risk  premium. When  the  current  account  switches  from  a deficit.
to a surplus  and  the  process  of debt  reduction  begins,  interest  rates
start  to decline,  also  returning  to their  pre-shock  levels.
d.  Increase  in government  expenditure
Since  the  long  run  stocks  of k and  z remain  unaffected  by changes  in
government  expenditures  and  since  the  long  run  behavior  of these  state
variahles  determine  the  dynamics,  changes  in government  expenditures  do
not  impact  on any  variable  other  than  consumption  and revenues. As- 28 -
government  expenditures  increase  (decrease)  a  corresponding  increase
(decrease)  in revenues  occurs,  leading  to a corresponding  decrease
(increase)  in  consumption.
IV.  Debt-Financed  Deficit  Policy
Up to this  point  we have assumed  that  the  government's  budget  is
continuously  balanced. This  assumption  is  a simplifying  one,  made in  part
to maintain  analytical  tractability.  1/  The  present  section  briefly
considers  a modification  wherein  the  domestic  government  finances  its
deficit  with the  issuance  of debt  instruments.  .
At the  outset  it  may  be noted  that  such  a debt  finance  policy
requires  an accommodating  one-for-all  adjustment  in the  initial  level  of
lump  sum taxes,  in  order  to  be sustainable  in the  long-run. Formally,
this  arises  from  the  fact  with the  stock  of government  debt constrained  to
adjust  continuously,  the  number  of unstable  roots  to the  dynamic  system
(3)  exceeds  the  number  of "jump"  variables  (2). In order  to  obtain  a
viable  solution  therefore,  an additional  "jump"  variable  is required.
This  may  be accomplished  by appropriately  choosing  the  initial  level  of
lump-sum  taxes. The  steady-state  of the  model  is  now  defined  by:
Ux(i)  - - 0  (23a)
io +  ilz  - il(a-z)  - io  +  il (a-2b)  - (23b)
i/  As discussed  in the  Appendix,  the  dynamic  structure  of the  balanced-
budget  variant  involves  four  differential  equations. With debt  finance,
the  resulting  dynamics  is  of the  fifth  order;  the  additional  source  of
dynamics  is  the  evolution  of the  stock  of government  debt  a.
2/ The technical  details  are  discussed  in the  Appendix.- 29 -
fk(k)  - io  + ilz  (23c)
f(k)  x  - g  - (io  +  il.Z)z  (23d)
T _ g  + (io  +  ilz)i  (23e)
,l(Z-zo)  + 02(k-ko)  + 03(a-ao)  - 0  (23f)
where  equations  (23a)  - (23e)  are  identical  to  equations  describing  the
steady-state  for  the  balanced-budget  case  while  (23f)  is  an additional
relationship  linking  changes  in  government  debt,  total  national  debt  and
capital  stock  that  as shown  in the  Appendix  must additionally  be
satisfied. The coefficients  #is  are  defined  as:
b1  - ai'[lJp 2-I'f'-i(p 1+A2-i)J  >  0
02 - Ai', 2I  '(p)0(1W)  <  0
03 - - (C1-i)(p 2-i)(/4l+P 2-i)  > 0
where  in turn  pl,  P2  are the  stable  (negative)  roots  of the  dynamic  system
(see  Appendix  for  details)  while  0(pi)  are  defined  as:
- i(Pf-i)+f"I  '
Pi  '
The steady-state  stock  levels  of k, z and  a are  jointly  determined  by
equation  (23b),  (23c)  and (23d)  and  depend  (via  (23f))  upon the  initial
conditions  ko,  ao and  zo.  Because  of this,  even temRorary  changes  can
give  rise to  Rermanent  effects. Once  k and  z are  determined  as above,- 30
the  balance  of payments  condition  (23d)  determines  steady-state
consumption  x while  A  may  now  be obtained  from  (23a). The  required
accommodation  in lump-sum  taxes  is  determined  from  (23e). Once  T is  set
in this  manner,  it is  not  thereafter  adjusted  and the  subsequent  deficit
is  bond  financed  with the  stock  of government  bonds  following  a second-
order  adjustment  path.  The  short-run  and long-run  effects  of the  various
disturbances  can  be analyzed  in  a  manner  similar  to that  previously  and
may  be briefly  summarized.  For  expositional  convenience  we restrict  our
remarks  to the  case  where  the  debt  schedule  is linear.
An upward  shift  in the  cost  of debt,  io,  will lower  both the  steady.
state  stock  of foreign  debt  and  physical  capital,  just  as it  did  before.
The  long-run  interest  rate  will  also increase  though  by less  than  the
increase  in  io.  Long-run  government  debt  may  either  rise  or fall. This
is  because  the  higher  interest  rate,  accompanied  by the  lower  foreign
debt  may,  or  may  not, raise  the  marginal  return  (or  cost)  of purchasing  an
additional  bond to consumers. If it  does,  a  will  have to  rise,  in  order
to maintain  this  marginal  return  equal  to the  fixed  rate  of consumer
discount  0.  But  if this  marginal  return  falls,  then  a will  have to rise-
for  the  same  reason.
The  short-run  responses  to  an upward  shift  in the  debt schedule  can
be analyzed  as  before. Again  we can  establish  that  the  long-run  declines
in  i and  z generate  short-run  decumulations  in these  quantities.  The
interest  rate  rises  more in the  short  run  and  the  higher  short-run- 31 -
interest  costs  to  the  government,  causes  a short-run  increase  in the  rate
of accumulation  of government  debt.
While  the  changes  in the  marginal  cost  of  debt il  and  government
expenditure  give  rise  to  virtually  the  same  responses  as before,  more
substantive  differences  arise  with  respect  to a  productivity  shock. Not
only  does it lead  to a long-run  increase  in  capital  stock  as before,  but
now  this  is accompanied  by higher  long-run  levels  of both  national  and
government  debt. The  higher  marginal  productivity  of capital  resulting
from  the  increase  in  productivity  raises  the  domestic  interest  rate,
thereby  encouraging  more  borrowing  from  abroad. The  higher  level  of
external  debt raises  the  marginal  rate  of return  of additional  bonds  to
domestic  consumers,  and  government  debt  will  have  to rise  in order  to
maintain  equality  with  p.  The  initial  responses  are  also  in the  direction
of the  long-run  effects.
V.  Alternative  SRecifications  of the  Debt  Functio
As noted  earlier,  it  has  been  argued  that  country  creditworthiness
may  not  be a function  of only  the  stock  of debt  alone. Factors  that  serve
to increase  productivity  or  growth,  or foreign  exchange  earnings,  may  all
serve  to indicate  an increased  capacity  to service  debt,  and  hence  shift
the  debt  supply  schedule  outwards. To incorporate  this  idea  the  debt
function  can  be altered  in  at least  two  interesting  ways.  Note that  the
above  argument  basically  requires  debt  to  be scaled  in  some  way in its
effect  on the  rate  of interest. The  central  point  appears  to  be that
creditors  are  not  as concerned  with the  absolute  amount  of debt  held by- 32 -
the  country  as with its  ability  to  service  the  debt,  which  is  better
represented  by debt  relative  to  some  measure  of servicing  capacity.
According  to this  line  of reasoning,  alternative  specifications  might  be
to  use  either  debt-output  (z/y)  or debt-capital  ratio  (z/k)  in (1)
above.  1/
With  employment  fixed  and  output  dependent  on capital  alone,  these
two  modifications  are  almost  identical.  Moreover,  neither  of them  alters
our  results  in  any  fundamental  way.
For  example,  if  one  were to  use  the  relationship
i(z/k)  - io  +  ilw(z/k)
and  assumes  a balanced  government  budget,  one  finds  that  the  two  critical
steady-state  equilibrium  relationship  (22b),  (22c)  are  modified  to
i(z/k)  - i'(z/k)(a-z)/k  - (22b)
fk(k)  - io  +  ilw(z/k)  (22c)
The interdependence  between  z  and  k in  the  determination  of the  interest
rate  now  breaks  down  the  earlier  recursivity  in the  long-run  equilibrium.
These  two  equations  now  jointly  determine  the  steady-state  stocks  of
capital  and  external  debt. The  changes  in these  equilibrium  levels  then
/  This  would  transform  (1)  to
i(z/y)  - io  +  ijw(z/y)  (1')
i(z/k)  - io  +  il(z/k)  (1")
respectively.- 33 -
drive  the  short-run  dynamics  as  before. Generally,  the  qualitative
behavior  of the  system  is little  changed. The  only  point  worth  noting  is
that  a productivity  disturbance  will  now  affect  the  steady  state  stocks  of
both  debt  and  capital.
VI.  Conclusion
Although  it  has long  been  recognized  that  small  developing  economies
can  borrow  only  at a  premium  and  therefore  face  an  upward  sloping  supply
of debt,  most existing  macrodynamic  models  of such  economies  treat  the
supply  of debt  as  being  infinitely  elastic. This  paper  has  departed  from
this  assumption  and  analyzed  the  dynamic  consequences  of  various  kinds  of
disturbances  in an  economy  facing  an  upward  sloping  supply  of debt.  The
presence  of such  a constraint  changes  the  dynamics  in fundamental  ways
from  those  which  occur  under  the  more  usual,  but less  realistic,
assumption  of  perfect  capital  mobility.
In order  to  highlight  the  issues  involved,  we have  based  most of our
analysis  on the  simplest  such  model  and  then  modified  it in  alternative
ways.  The  basic  model  is  one  in  which  the  government  maintains  a  balanced
budget,  the  cost  of debt  rises  with its  absolute  level,  and  employment
remains  fixed. We have  emphasized  the  tradeoffs  which  exist  between  the
rate  of capital  accumulation,  on the  one  hand,  and  the  rate  of
accumulation  of foreign  debt,  on the  other,  and  analyzed  how  these  respond
to the  various  exogenous  disturbances.
In this  basic  model,  the  only  sources  of disturbances  which  incur
dynamic  tradeoffs  are  disturbances  either  to the  supply  of debt function,- 34 -
or the  production  function. To some  extent,  the  effects  on the  economy
are  sensitive  to the  form  of the  debt  supply  function,  in  particular  its
degree  of convexity,  as well  as the  net  asset  position  of domestic  private
residents. The  main  findings,  summarized  as follows,  are  based  on  what  we
view as  being  the  most  plausible  assumptions  with  respect  to the  aspect:
(1) An upward  shift  in the  supply  of debt,  which  may  be taken  to
represent  an exogenous  increase  in the  world  interest  rate,
leads  to  a long-run  decline  in  external  debt,  a partially  higher
domestic  interest  rate,  and  a lower  capital  stock. The
combination  of the  lower  external  debt  and  the  only  partial
response  of the  domestic  interest  rate  results  in  a  decline  in
the  long-run  cost  of servicing  the  external  debt,  implying  a
reduction  in the  long-run  trade  surplus. In the  short  run,  the
domestic  interest  rate  responds  fully  to the  higher  foreign
interest  rate,  causing  total  interest  costs  to  rise. The rate
of investment  falls,  generating  a sufficient  increase  in the
trade  surplus  for  the  stock  of external  debt to  begin  to
decline,  along  with  the  capital  stock. The transitional  path
for  foreign  debt  is non-monotonic.  At some  stage,  the  trade
surplus  becomes  a deficit  and  further  debt is  accumulated  as the
new steady-state  equilibrium  is  approached.
(2) An increase  in  the  marginal  cost  of  debt (risk  premium),  while
almost  certainly  raising  the  long-run  domestic  interest  rate  and
lowering  the  capital  stock,  may  or  may  not, lower  long-run- 35 -
external  debt  as well. Whether  the  stock  of debt  is reduced  or
not  depends  upon the  ratio  of the  country's  external  debt  to the
net  credit  of its  private  sector. If this  ratio  is  greater  than
some  critical  value (which  depends  the  form  of the  debt  supply
function),  then  foreign  debt  is reduced  in the  long  run  and  vice
versa. The trade  balance  adjusts  in the  direction  of the
surplus  of the  long-run  impact  of the  shock  on debt  accumulation
is  positive;  i.e.,  if the  country  is  not  heavily  indebted.
Otherwise,  the  effect  is  uncertain.
(3) A positive  productivity  disturbance,  resulting  from  say
structural  efficiency-enhancing  measures,  will  raise  the  long-
run  stock  of capital,  while  leaving  the  long-run  level  of
external  debt  and  interest  rate  unchanged. In the  short  run,
since  capital  is  now  more  productive,  it  begins  to  accumulate.
A current  account  deficit  is therefore  generated  and  foreign
debt is  accumulated,  leading  to a  higher  interest  rate.  The
accumulation  of debt,  however,  is  only  temporary. Eventually  as
output  increases,  the  current  account  deficit  turns  to  a surplus
and  debt,  along  with the  interest  rate,  returns  to its  original
level.
(4) A fiscal  expansion,  taking  the  form  of  an increase  in government
expenditure  has  virtually  no effect,  either  in the  short  run  or
in  the  long  run. All  that  occurs  is that  consumers  immediately- 36  -
offset  the  additional  government  expenditure  with  an equal
reduction  in  private  consumption.
Host  of thsse  conclusions  carry  over  to  the  more  general  models,
though  with  modifications  in  some instances.  For  example,  in  the  case  of
a  bond-ftnanced  deficit,  the  only  substantive  change  that  occurs  is that  a
productivity  shock  now  has a long-run  effect  on the  level  of external  debt
as  well.  Increased  capital  accumulation  as a result  of  a positive
productivity  disturbance  will  now  be accompanied  by both  higher  stocks  of
external  and  government  debt  in  t}.e  long  run.
Modifying  the  debt  supply  function  and  specifying  it in terms  of debt
relative  to some  measure  of the  country's  economic  performance  such  as
output  or capital  stock  also  leaves  things  mostly  unchanged. Again  the
main  difference  is  that  the  long-run  stock  of foreign  debt  will no longer.
be independent  of the  productivity  shock. As capital  or output
increases,  the  marginal  cost  of debt  declines,  allowing  a higher  long-run
stock  of debt.
One important  feature  of our  results  is  the  limited  role  for
government  expenditure  policy. This  is  a direct  consequence  of the
assumption  that  employment  is  fixed. As a result,  both the  long-run  stock
of debt  and the  long-run  stock  of capital  are  determined  independently  of
government  expenditure. Since  it  is the  changes  in these  long-run
equilibrium  stocks  which  drive  the  short-run  dynamics,  the  latter  are  also
independent  of government  expenditure.  Endogenizing  employment  increases
the  role  for  government  expenditure  policy. While  the  long-run  capital-- 37 -
labor  ratio  remains  independent  of government  expenditure,  the  long-run
capital  stock  itself,  and  therefore  the  short-run  dynamics  do respond  to
this  form  of fiscal  policy.
In conclusion,  perhaps  it is  worthwhile  to  summarize  some
implications  of this  analysis  for  growth  and  adjustment.  The  model
discussed  in  this  paper,  suggests  that  demand-management  approaches  to
adjustment  which  seek  to reduce  the  fiscal  deficit,  while  reducing  debt
accumulation,  are  likely  to  have a  negative  impact  on growth. Policies
for  structural  adjustment  that  enhance  productivity  and  the  more  efficient
utilization  of capital  will increase  capital  accumulation  and  hence
growth,  but these  policies  will  also  increase  the  stock  of external  debt.
The increase  in  debt  may  only  be transitory  if  the  debt  supply  function
depends  upon the  absolute  level  of debt,  rather  than  on its  level  relative
to  the  capacity  of the  economy. But  even  if the  debt  supply  function  is
such  as to lead  to  higher  long-run  stock  of debt,  this  increased  level  of
debt  will  nevertheless  be sustainable  in the  long  run.- 38 - APPENDIX
1.  DynMamic  prperties with  balanced  budget
Under  the  z.zumption  of a  balanced  budget  the  dynamic  structure  of
the  system  (20)  is  a fourth  order  system,  which  may  be expressed  in
linearized  form  about  the  steady-state  equilibrium
fo  0  0  -A(2iV-i-b)  f 
qfJ  - 0zi  -fkk  i[  qqJ  (Al)
0  Is  0  0  k-k
x'  Is  -fk  i+i'z  z-z_
where  the  elements  appearing  in  the  matrix  are  evaluated  at steady  state.
The  dynamic  properties  of the  economy  depend  critically  upon  the
eigenvalues  of the  characteristic  equation  of (Al),  namely
_(_-i)  _(#-i)+fkkI'
p(p-i)-[iVzp-xwa 14J  I*  i  - 0(0  (A2)
where  the  element  a1 l  * -A(2i'-i"b).
Assuming  2i'-i"b  >  0, the  following  properties  can  be established:
(1) The  product  of the  four  roots  is  positive,  implying  that  there
are  either  0, 2  or 4 positive  roots.
(2) The sum  of the  roots  is  positive,  ruling  out  the  case  of 0
positive  roots.
(3) The  coefficient  of p in (A2)  is  negative,  ruling  out  the
possibility  of all  roots  being  positive.
We are  therefore  left  with the  case  of 2  positive  and  2  negative  roots,
which  may  be ordered  s; follows-39  -PPENDIX
A1 < A2 < 0 < A3 <  A4  (A3)
The  dynamics  is  therefore  a saddlepoint,  with the  stock  variables  k and  z
evilving  gradually  at all  time,  and  the  shadow  prices  A, q  being  allowed
to  undergo  instantaneous  jumps  in response  to  new information.
The  quantities  4(Al),  0(p 2),as  defined  in (A2)  are  both  critical
parts  of the  solution. By direct  evaluation  of the  characteristic
equation,  one  can  establish
O(Al)  > 0 >  (P2)  (A4)
where  P1l  P2,  are  ordered  as above.
We shall  focus  our  analysis  on stable  adjustment  paths  beginning  from
given  initial  capital  stock  ko and  stock  of  national  debt  zo.  The
solutions  for  k, z, A,  and  q along  such  paths  are
_  [p(A 2)dk-dz]  plt  [dz-O(P 1)dk]  2  2t
k -k+  (A5)
- (p 1)[ (p 2)dk-dzl  plt  +  (u 2)1dz-4(Al)dkJ y2t  ()
a 40(p 1)r  )  (p 2)dk-dz 1  Ap  +  a 4 (p2)r  dz-( 11)dk  A t
Al1  L(i)-# 2)  J  e  2  l(A1)-I(A2)  ]e  (A7)- 40 - APPENDIX
is  O  (A2  )dk-dz 1  Al  2[  dz o(,ul)dk  A  y2t
q - q +  '4)(p 2)-dz  e2  1  +  eI'  e')-4z  12  (A8)
where dk - - ko, dz - z - zo denote the long-run changes in k and z from
their  respective  initial  starting  points.
jp 1t  jH2t
One can eliminate e  ,  e  ,  to define the two locuses
-a  14  2  4)(I 2)  l)(  a14O(-1)O(  2)  1  [k-  (A9)
1-+(  >l2  2  -1  2-
'Al-A2  - 201 (J  )-JA 102(12)
q-q  - (Z-Z)  +  (k-k)  (A10)
These  are  both three  dimensional  planes  relating  the  respective
instantaneous  shadow  prices  to the  slowly  evolving  dynamic  variables  k and
z.  They  are  the  analogues  to the  usual  two  dimensional  stable  adjustment
paths  associated  with  saddlepoints.
The  solutions  reported  in equations  (A5)  - (A8)  form  the  basis  for
the  analysis  of the  short-run  dynamics  in  response  to the  various
disturbances  presented  in  Section  IV.  The  different  shocks  identified
differ  simply  in  terms  of how  they  impact  on the  long-run  equilibrium
stock  of capital  and  national  debt.
2.  Dynamic  properties  with  debt-financed  deficit
When the  government's  budget  is  permitted  to  be imbalanced  via  the- 41 - APPENDIX
use  of debt  financing,  the  dynamics  of the  economy  are  governed  by a
fifth-order  system  which  may  be stated  in  linearized  form  as follows:
0  0  0  -A(2i'+i"b)  Ai'  Ax-
0  i  fkk  i  0  q-q
_  - x'  I'  O  0  0  k-k  (All)
Z  xi  I'  fk  (i+i'z)  0  z-z
a  0  0  0  ai'  i  a-a
This system  may  be shown  to  have  two  stable  roots  (P11  P2  <  0) and  three
unstable  roots  (p3,  p4,  p5 >  0).  Analogous  to (A5)  - (A8),  the  stable
solution,  starting  from  initial  stocks  ko,  zo is
_  p1t  p2 t
k - k+  Ae  +  A2e  (A13)
jult  'u2t
z - z +  4(pl)Ale  +  ;(A 2 )  2 (A14)
i' ra 14 Ai'a  plt  it ra 4 Ai'a  p2t
_ +  i'  +  i  0(p)Ae  l  A2  i  - 0  _i  (A2A)  e  (A15)
- Al  Pit  A2  p 2t
q  - q  + - Ale  + I-  A2e  (A16)
a--  -- + ai'  0( 1) Ale  +  a#i  (2 2)  1e  (A17)
where  4(ii)  and  a14 are  defined  as  previously  and  for  notational
convenience  A1 and  A2 are  given  by-42-  APPEN
0(p 2 )dk-dz  dz-o(p 1)dk
A1 - *  A  - A  G)(0 2)  (Al8)
The  assumption  that  the  stock  of government  debt  evolves  continuously  from
the  initial  level  ao,  can  be shown  to imply  the  relationships
01(z(t)-zo)+02(k(t)-ko)+03(a(t)-ao)=O  (A19)
101(Z  zo)+02(i--ko)+03(a-ao)-O  (A19')
where
01 - ai'  (A1 2 - I fkk- i(l  +  2  )]> 0  (A20)
2 -iaiI  (Pl)O(P2)  <  0  (A21)
3  - (/A 1 - i)(A 2 - i)(0 1 +  2  i)  > 0  (A22)
The  significance  of (A19)  is that  the  dynamics  of government  debt  a
becomes  tied  to that  of k and  z.  There  are  in fact  only  two  linearly
independent  unstable  roots. As a further  consequence,  (A19')  imposes  an
additional  constraint  on the  steady  state  equilibrium,  one  which  involves
the  initial  points  ko,  zo and  ao.- 43  -
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